Christology

Paul's writings treat Jesus as subordinate to the Father — 1 Corinthians 8:6 distinguishes 'one God, the Father' from 'one Lord, Jesus Christ.' In John 17:3, Jesus himself defines eternal life as knowing 'the only true God' — the Father — and Jesus Christ whom he sent, making a clear distinction. Mark 12:29 records Jesus affirming the Shema: the Lord our God is one Lord. Even the Trinitarian proof-text Matthew 28:19 ('baptising in the name of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit') appears in a form that Luke 9:26 and Acts 2:38 contradict.

The Ebionites — early Jewish Christians — rejected Jesus's divinity entirely. Clement of Rome, Polycarp, and other Apostolic Fathers show no awareness of a Trinitarian formula. Origen taught the Son was subordinate to the Father. Tertullian (c. 200 CE) invented the Latin term 'Trinitas' — meaning the doctrine literally did not have a name for its first two centuries. The Cappadocian Fathers (4th century) further developed the concepts of hypostasis and ousia. This is a history of theological evolution, not preservation of an original teaching.

First, show one unambiguous Old Testament verse where God says 'I am three persons' or 'worship me as a Trinity.' Second, name one pre-Nicene Church Father who articulated the co-equal, co-eternal Trinity as defined at Nicaea in 325 CE. Third, explain how Jesus can be fully God (omniscient, omnipotent) and fully man (limited, ignorant) without contradiction. Fourth, explain how three distinct persons can each be fully God yet there is only one God — without it being either tritheism or modalism.

Emmanuel means 'God is with us' — it's a theophoric name, not an ontological claim. Hebrew names routinely contain God's name: Elijah ('my God is Yahweh'), Daniel ('God is my judge'). Nobody claims Elijah is literally Yahweh because of his name. Similarly, 'Mighty God' in Isaiah 9:6 is debated — the Hebrew 'El Gibbor' can refer to a mighty hero or ruler. Even if it means 'Mighty God,' the same title is applied to human judges in Psalm 82.

If all three persons are co-equal, there should be no hierarchy of blasphemy. Yet Jesus himself ranks the Spirit above the Son in terms of blasphemy. This suggests the early Christians did not view the Son and Spirit as co-equal — the Spirit had a different, possibly higher, status.

An omniscient God cannot not-know something. If Jesus is fully God, he must know everything God knows. But he explicitly says he does not know the hour of judgement. This is not 'choosing not to use omniscience' — he says he does not know. This is a definitive statement of Jesus's non-omniscience, and therefore his non-divinity.

This is the key question of historical Christology. The earliest sources (Q source, early Mark) show Jesus as a prophet who prays to God, submits to God's will, and distinguishes himself from God. The christological titles escalate across the Gospels — from 'teacher' in Mark to 'I and the Father are one' in John, the last gospel written (c. 90-100 CE). This is literary development, not historical memory. The disciples never worshipped Jesus as God — that was a gentile Christian innovation under Paul's influence.

Uthman announces the second prompt: I do not believe Jesus is God himself according to the Bible.

Uthman cites John 17:20-21, where Jesus prays for his disciples: I do not pray for these alone, but for those who will believe in me through their word, that they all may be one as you, Father, are in me and I in you — that they may be one in us. If I and the Father are one means Jesus is God (in the sense of sharing divine nature), then by the same logic all believers who are described as being one in the same way would also be God. The student concedes the point: we are not God. Uthman then presses: if the same word one is used for believers and for Jesus, it cannot establish divine identity for Jesus specifically.

Uthman quotes John 17:3 — the words of Jesus himself in the red-letter text: This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom you have sent. In a single sentence Jesus distinguishes God (whom he addresses as the only true God) from himself (Jesus Christ, whom you have sent). God is the sender; Jesus is the one sent. Jesus also continuously calls God my God throughout the Bible — including post-resurrection. This language is that of a prophet in relationship with God, not that of a being claiming to be God.

Uthman cites Revelation 3:12 — a post-resurrection statement attributed to Jesus: He who overcomes, I will make him a pillar in the temple of my God. Even after the resurrection and glorification, Jesus still refers to God as my God. If Jesus were God himself, the statement my God becomes incoherent — you do not call yourself your own God. The student in the chair is unable to answer this point and is voted out. Uthman summarizes: Jesus calling God my God, repeatedly throughout the Bible and even post-resurrection, demonstrates he is not God but a servant and prophet of God.

Uthman cites multiple New Testament uses of ego imai by non-divine beings. In Luke 1:19, the angel Gabriel says: I am Gabriel, ego imai, who stands before God and I am sent to speak to you. In John 9, the blind man healed by Jesus uses ego imai when asked if he is the man who was healed — I am. Paul uses ego imai. Rabbis use it. In Matthew, a rabbi says I am the rabbi using ego imai. Uthman lists at least six or seven examples of ego imai used by people other than God. If ego imai is a secret divine name from Exodus, then the New Testament is full of gods — Gabriel, the blind man, Paul, rabbis. The form is a common Greek first-person expression meaning I am, not an exclusive divine claim.

Uthman explains that in Islamic theology, the prophethood of every prophet was decreed and established before the creation of the world. There is even a Hadith where Adam saw the names and qualities of all his descendants, including prophets like David. So Jesus saying before Abraham was, I existed — referring to his prophethood being established before Abraham's time on earth — is entirely consistent with the prophetic tradition. The Jews who heard it were likely confused about the age question: how could this thirty-year-old man say he existed in the time of Abraham? They were reacting to what seemed like an absurd age claim, not necessarily to a claim of divine pre-existence.

Uthman quotes Mark 13:32 (also in Matthew 24:36): of that day and hour no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father. God is all-knowing at all times — this is a fundamental divine attribute. But here Jesus himself says he does not know the hour. If Jesus is God and God is all-knowing, then Jesus must know the hour. The verse explicitly says the Son does not know. Therefore, either Jesus is not God, or the verse is false.

Uthman presses the logical contradiction: God is all-knowing at all times. This is not a negotiable attribute — it is part of what makes God, God. Just as God cannot lie (Numbers 23:19 states God is not a man that he should lie), God cannot fail to know something. He then specifically isolates the ability-to-know distinction the Catholic used: "I did not ask you if you had the ability to. That is like me saying I have the ability to work out and lift 350 pounds, but I cannot." The student replies: "Or you are just not doing it right now." Uthman confirms: exactly — so at that moment Jesus genuinely did not know the hour. He then returns to the divine attribute: God is all-knowing at ALL times. A being that does not know something at any moment, for any reason, cannot be God. The same argument applies to death: God cannot die, but Christians say Jesus died. Either Jesus is God (and these events did not truly happen) or Jesus died and was not God.

Uthman reaches the crux of the argument: the Catholic said Jesus limited himself and therefore did not know the hour. But God is all-knowing at all times — this is the essence of God. To say God limited his omniscience is to say God stopped being all-knowing. But if God stopped being all-knowing, he stopped being God. You cannot have a being who is God and simultaneously not know something — regardless of the reason. The same logic applies to death: God cannot die. If Jesus died on the cross, the dying entity cannot have been God. The Catholic responds by saying God is a complex entity, but Uthman points out that complexity does not resolve a logical contradiction.

Uthman announces the third prompt: I believe Jesus is a prophet of God and a servant of God in accordance with the Bible.

Uthman asks: so you are saying God sent Jesus? The student says yes. Uthman responds: then that negates him being God, because he is sent by God. If God himself came, he would not say he is a messenger of God — he would say I am God. When you say God sent Jesus, you are saying a sender (God) dispatched a recipient (Jesus). These are two distinct entities. God sent God is a statement that only makes sense if you already believe in two separate divine persons — which is a Trinitarian presupposition, not a biblical inference. The student transitions to asking about Islamic theology of creation rather than pressing the point.

Uthman gives a concrete analogy: if he wants to send a message to someone, he sends a person — say, Ameen — as his messenger. Ameen would say I am a messenger of Uthman. But if Uthman himself came to deliver the message, he would not say I am a messenger of Uthman — he would say I am Uthman and here is my message. The fact that Jesus is described throughout the Bible as a prophet of God, a messenger of God, and a servant of God places him in the role of the sent one, not the sender. If Jesus were God himself, these descriptions would be self-defeating. God does not send himself and then describe the sent one as his own servant.

Uthman argues that being the vehicle of God, the message of God, and the messenger of God does not make you God — it makes you the most excellent of God's messengers. Moses was a messenger of God, the vehicle for God's revelation, and the channel of the message — but Moses was not God. If God himself came to earth, he would not be described as a messenger OF God. He would simply be God. The word of belongs to a possessive relationship: you can only be the messenger of someone else. A being cannot simultaneously be God and be a messenger sent from God — these are logically exclusive categories. Jesus being the most complete messenger of God in the Christian framework still places him as a distinct being from God.

Uthman presses the doctrine: if the divine nature and the human nature of Jesus do not communicate in the sense that the human nature cannot access omniscience, does Jesus have two personalities? The Presbyterian says he misspoke — there IS communication but not fully within the natures. Uthman restates the problem: the human and divine natures coexisted in one person on earth, the person knew something (through divine nature) while simultaneously not knowing it (through human nature), and the natures did not fully share this information. He asks whether this makes sense theologically. The Presbyterian confirms the hypostatic union: one person, the God-man. He is voted out before fully resolving the contradiction.

Uthman quotes John 14:28, a statement by Jesus: the Father is greater than I. This verse directly contradicts the claim that all three persons are co-equal. If the Father is greater than the Son, they are not equal. The participant confirms that Jesus does say this — it is in the text. Uthman notes that Jesus says this repeatedly in the Bible, not just once, and he never qualifies the statement as applying only to his human nature.

Uthman presses: Jesus does not say the Father is greater than my human nature — he says the Father is greater than I. The statement applies to Jesus as a whole person, not to one nature in isolation. If Jesus is one person and that person says the Father is greater than I, then the Father is greater than that person. You cannot split the statement across natures when Jesus himself does not make that distinction in the text.

Uthman asks: if the divine nature was present in Jesus at all times and is fully omniscient, how did Jesus not know whether a fig tree had fruit on it? He went to check. He also had to eat, sleep, and perform all human biological functions. If the divine nature was truly present and omniscient, and if the one person of Jesus has access to both natures, then Jesus should have known everything the divine nature knows — including whether the fig tree had fruit. The participant gives the same answer: the person knows through the divine nature, but the human nature did not know. Uthman asks: does that make sense to you, really? The participant pauses and ultimately says no, it does not make sense to him.

Uthman argues that all-knowledge is essential to what God is — it cannot be limited even voluntarily without God ceasing to be God. He uses an analogy: if you say a monkey is God and argue it is a mystery, that fails — we can clearly say a being that throws excrement is not God. Similarly, if a being does not know something (like the hour of judgment), we can say with certainty that this being is not God — because God is all-knowing at all times by definition. The core attributes of God must be understandable enough to be the basis of faith. If Jesus did not know the hour, by definition he is not God.

Uthman quotes Acts 3:13: the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob — the God of our fathers — glorified his servant Jesus. The verse uses the phrase his servant Jesus. The God of Abraham is glorifying someone he calls his servant. The participant who just agreed that God cannot be a servant of anybody is now confronted with the Bible calling Jesus God's servant. Since God cannot be a servant but the Bible calls Jesus God's servant, Jesus cannot be God. The participant agrees: Jesus being a servant of God means he is not God.

Uthman asks: would you agree that God cannot be lower than the angels? The participant answers yes, absolutely. Uthman then cites Hebrews 2:7-9, which states that Jesus was made a little lower than the angels. If God cannot be lower than the angels, and Jesus was made lower than the angels, then Jesus cannot be God. The participant agrees with both premises and both conclusions: Jesus as described in Hebrews is below God and below the angels, making him a prophet and a servant — not God. Uthman adds that in Islamic belief, pious people and prophets are even higher in status than the angels. The participant laughs and says they are in agreement on this. He then mentions he is finding it increasingly difficult to believe in God at all due to his physics studies — and is voted out.